Page 13 - The Indian EYE 092526

OPINION SEPTEMBER 25, 2026 | The Indian Eye 13

these issues appears thin. Both sides Clearly, there remains a deep
acknowledge that any escalation chasm between the rhetoric of ‘con-
without guardrails will inflict high structive partnership of strategic
costs on each other. The all-out tar- stability’ and the developments un-
iff war in the early months of 2025 derway. Therefore, Xi’s upcoming
disrupted consumer prices, sup- visit to the US, rather than a demon-
ply-chains and economic activity, stration of constructive partnership,
demonstrating the real damage un- is another high-level attempt to sta-
managed rivalry can cause. In that bilise ties that remain highly volatile.
context, the US–China joint state- Observers contend that China–US
ment emphasising cooperation and leader-level summits have become a
the subsequent agreement to pause strategy to contain crises rather than
the tariff war after the Geneva talks a ‘reward for good relations’.
in 2025 reflected both sides’ affir- This shift indicates how deep-
mation of the need to regulate the ly the nature of Sino-US rivalry has
relationship’s disruptive dynamics. changed with the trade and tech war.
Therefore, the Xi–Trump meeting in What is unfolding is not merely a race
May also marked a continuation of towards technological and economic
bilateral efforts to stabilise the rela- pre-eminence, the two sides are also
tionship at the highest level. simultaneously engaged in reducing
Filled with photo-op moments, vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the other and
the May 2026 summit, however, pro- signalling resolve through calibrated
duced no substantive convergence punitive measures to deter the other
between the two countries on what Filled with photo-op moments, the May 2026 summit in Beijing, however, produced no sub- from exploiting any perceived weak-
constructive strategic stability would ness. In this scenario, no domain re-
require to function properly or what stantive convergence between the two countries mains insulated from weaponisation.
factors could upend the arrange- This leader-level summit should be
ment. The Chinese readout, issued and reciprocity could mean that US 200 Boeing planes and to increase seen as an exercise in preventing fur-
after the meeting, said that construc- commitments arrived at the summit imports of US beef and poultry prod- ther issues from being subsumed into
tive strategic stability consisted of are reversible and are contingent on ucts. Further, Chinese exports of the broader strategic rivalry.
‘Four Stabilities’: positive stability larger Chinese purchases of Ameri- rare-earth minerals to the US have This trade and tech war has cre-
with cooperation as the mainstay; can agricultural and industrial prod- also remained low, as some Chinese ated significant strategic pressures
healthy stability with competition ucts and possibly US oil, relaxation in firms halted shipments to the US out for New Delhi, leading to major eco-
within proper limits; constant sta- critical minerals supply to the US and of fear of repercussions from Beijing. nomic and supply-chain risks. US
bility with manageable differences; Chinese investments in ‘non-strate- Similarly, the trade and tech war controls on access to cutting-edge
and lasting stability with expectable gic and non-sensitive areas’, cooper- has hardly eased. The US increased tech and Chinese restrictions on ra-
peace. ation on curbing the flow of fentanyl, tariffs on Chinese imports and add- re-earth critical minerals have also
From the Chinese perspective, a step-up in Chinese cooperation ed 43 Chinese firms to the Uyghur subsequently affected Indian indus-
this translates into first, respecting on the US–Israel–Iran conflict, the Forced Labor Entity List created tries. Therefore, close attention to the
China’s four red lines—the Taiwan Ukraine war and possibly in con- under the Uyghur Forced Labor summit’s outcome will be essential,
question, democracy and human straining North Korea’s nuclear Prevention Act, introduced in June as the two powers will meet closely
rights, China’s path and development weapons programme. Notably, these 2022. In June 2026, Washington also after the 2026 BRICS Summit. Their
and China’s development rights. Sec- references were absent from the Chi- added top Chinese tech firms BYD, policy positions about trade, tech and
ond, establishing predictable trade nese Foreign Ministry statement. Alibaba, and Baidu to its military larger geopolitics will impact many of
relations by loosening export controls Given domestic exigencies, the blacklist under Section 1260H of the the agendas, like supply-chain resil-
and sanctions, increasing investment inconsistencies in Chinese and US National Defense Authorization Act. ience, access to rare-earth and criti-
and recognising China as an import- announcements are understandable, This imposes significant restrictions cal minerals, energy security, cyber-
ant trading partner. Third, China is as neither side would want to appear on their business activities in the US security and tariff barriers, that will
also seeking détente on technolog- bullied. Therefore, each side high- market. The US government is also be of major importance to India and
ical competition, whereby the US lighted the aspects that would give it planning to impose additional over- other like-minded countries.
withdraws sanctions and restrictions the most domestic political capital. capacity tariffs on Chinese imports.
on high-end chips and tech equip- The full extent of the agreements will Notably, in recent months, Bei- Dr. Mayuri Banerjee is a Associate
ment, acceding to ‘China’s right to become clearer as bilateral ties prog- jing has also retaliated by adding Fellow with the East Asia Centre at the
technological development’. ress. However, it still does not clar- 10 US robotics, rare-earth and de- Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence
The point is that the US has not ify how far the two powers are pre- fence-related companies to its Ex- Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New
explicitly acknowledged any of these pared to accommodate each other’s port Control List and blocking an- Delhi where she focuses on Chinese
conditions, which seem to be the ba- core concerns. By contrast, structural other 46 defence companies from foreign policy and strategy and Chinese
sis of China’s understanding of con- pressures and deep mistrust make it government procurement. Addition- media narratives
structive strategic stability. Instead, more likely that the new diplomatic ally, China has barred the export of Views expressed are of the author and
the fact sheet that was released from framework is a stopgap strategy for drones and drone components to the do not necessarily reflect the views of
the White House stated, in a slight- both sides to manage short-term fric- US, banned US certification agencies the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the
ly rephrased manner, that the two tion without mitigating the rivalry. from conducting factory-tracking in- Government of India.
leaders had agreed to establish a Following the May summit, the spections for the China Compulso-
‘constructive relationship of strategic ground report on many of the is- ry Certification (CCC) system, and The full version of this article first ap-
stability based on fairness and reci- sues that were discussed is not very added US firm Compliance Testing peared in the Comments section of the
procity’. optimistic. For instance, beyond soy- LLC to the countermeasures list, in- website (www.idsa.in) of Manohar Parri-
Reading Trump’s understanding bean imports, China has made little creasing the costs of US exports to kar Institute for Defense Studies and Anal-
of strategic stability based on fairness progress on its commitment to buy China. yses, New Delhi, on September 17, 2026

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